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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the voluntary deductible in the Dutch health
insurance system reduces moral hazard or acts only as a cost reduction tool for
low-risk individuals. We use a sample of 14,089 observations, comprising 2,939
individuals over seven waves from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the
Social sciences panel for the analysis. We employ bivariate models that jointly
model the choice of a deductible and health care utilization and supplement
the identification with an instrumental variable strategy. The results show that
the voluntary deductible reduces moral hazard, especially in the decision to
visit a doctor (extensive margin) compared with the number of visits (intensive
margin). In addition, a robustness test shows that selection on moral hazard is
not present in this context.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
It is well-known that comprehensive (health) insurance may lead to moral hazard—that is, a change in health behavior
in response to lower out-of-pocket health care costs. Various cost-sharing options are used by policy makers and health
insurers to counteract moral hazard, such as copayments and deductibles. In the managed competition health care sys-
tem settings of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and (to a lesser extent) the United States, a voluntary deductible is offered
to the consumer in addition to a mandatory deductible in return for a premium rebate (van Winssen, Van Kleef, & Van
de Ven, 2015; Zweifel & Manning, 2000). However, current empirical evidence on the existence of moral hazard effects
in relation to a voluntary deductible in a managed competition setting is mixed. In the Dutch setting, Remmerswaal
et al. (2019) compare health care costs before and after the deductible kicks in at age 18 using administrative insurance
claims data and show that the voluntary deductible does not reduce the health care costs for this age group. Analyzing
the Swiss market using data from the Swiss Health Survey, which covers all of Switzerland, Schellhorn (2001) does not
find any significant effects of a deductible on the number of doctor visits. However, Gardiol, Geoffard, and Grand-
champ (2005) and Trottmann, Zweifel, and Beck (2012), using data from a large insurance company, and Gerfin and
Schellhorn (2006), using data from the Swiss Health Survey, find significant, negative effects of the size of the
deductible on health care costs.
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Naturally, a degree of selection may occur if the deductible is voluntary. Healthy individuals choose a higher
deductible, and less healthy individuals opt for no deductible, which ultimately leads to a transfer of costs from healthy
individuals to unhealthy individuals (Nyman, 1999). van Kleef, Beck, van de Ven, and van Vliet (2008), using the data
from Switzerland, show that this transfer of costs can be substantial due to a large selection effect. In addition, Croes,
Katona, Mikkers, and Shestalova (2018) find substantial selection effects of the voluntary deductible in the Netherlands.
Given the mixed evidence related to moral hazard and the high probability of adverse selection, requests in the
Dutch press and in politics have been made to abandon the voluntary deductible on the grounds that it undermines
the solidarity principle of health insurance and drives up health insurance costs for people who use a lot of care
(de Koning & Don, 2019; NPO, 2017).
To provide additional background on this debate, we use panel data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the
Social sciences (LISS) for the years 2009–2016 to investigate whether the voluntary deductible in the Netherlands has
served its purpose of reducing moral hazard or has acted only as a cost reduction tool for low-risk individuals.
As Einav and Finkelstein (2018) argue, in the absence of randomized trial data (such as the RAND experiment; see,
e.g., Aron-Dine, Einav, & Finkelstein, 2013), credible reduced-form empirical studies, which often rely on few modeling
assumptions, are a powerful tool for retrospectively answering the question whether moral hazard exists. However, sev-
eral issues complicate the empirical separation of moral hazard and selection effects, which we address in this paper.
First, a well-known methodological issue in this type of research is establishing causality. It is commonly observed that
individuals who opt for a deductible use less health care. However, it is unclear whether and how much of this relation-
ship is due to the incentive effect known as moral hazard on the one hand or self-selection of healthier individuals into
insurance contracts with a voluntary deductible on the other hand. From an econometric perspective, even after health
status and other individual characteristics are controlled for, some unobserved characteristics may be correlated with
both the deductible decision and health care utilization (Finkelstein, 2014). Most of the literature on the effects of insur-
ance coverage that uses observational data solves this problem with various bivariate parametric models that jointly
model the selection decision and the health care utilization outcome (e.g., Bolhaar, Lindeboom, & Van Der
Klaauw, 2012; Cameron, Trivedi, Milne, & Piggott, 1988; Jones, Koolman, & Van Doorslaer, 2006; Kiil & Arendt, 2017;
Schellhorn, 2001). Although bivariate models are identified by functional form due to nonlinearity, most studies supple-
ment the identification strategy using an instrumental variable for insurance coverage (Bratti & Miranda, 2011). Follow-
ing the literature, we also estimate bivariate models for selection into the deductible and health care utilization using
an instrumental variable for the endogenous voluntary deductible. Similar to Schellhorn (2001), we use the availability
of supplementary insurance coverage as an instrument because, in the Netherlands, supplementary insurance covers
health services that are not covered by basic health insurance, but it does not directly affect treatment choices or out-of-
pocket payments within the services covered by basic insurance. Moreover, choice of supplementary insurance is
strongly correlated with choice of the deductible.
The second econometric issue in our analysis is related to the type of health care utilization measures that we use.
We consider four measures in our analysis: visits to a specialist, visits to a general practitioner (GP), visits to a mental
health care provider, and days spent in the hospital. Notably, mental health care utilization has not been analyzed
before in the context of voluntary deductibles (see Gardiol et al., 2005; Gerfin & Schellhorn, 2006; Schellhorn, 2001).
The distribution of these outcome variables includes a large number of individuals with zero visits or days in the hospi-
tal, whereas the rest are distributed continuously. Because of this setup, in our analysis, we model both the probability
of visiting a doctor or spending time in the hospital and the actual number of visits/days. We show that it is important
to allow for both relationships because the moral hazard effects differ between the two types of decisions.
Third, the analysis of moral hazard is made even more complex by the multidimensional nature of the selection
effects. Textbook models predict that when there is asymmetric information between the insurance company and cus-
tomers, individuals with high risks and high expected health care utilization buy health insurance with more coverage,
which results in adverse selection (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). The literature contains ample evidence for adverse
selection (e.g., Bolhaar et al., 2012; Cameron et al., 1988; Jones et al., 2006). However, some evidence also points to the
existence of advantageous selection (Bolhaar et al., 2012; Cutler, Finkelstein, & McGarry, 2008; Finkelstein &
McGarry, 2006). Advantageous selection happens when risk is negatively related to other factors that positively influ-
ence the demand for insurance. To examine the presence of such factors, we employ a test for multidimensional asym-
metric information, as suggested by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), and provide evidence of adverse selection for the
utilization of physical health care and advantageous selection for the utilization of mental health care.
Finally, Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf, and Cullen (2013) show that in addition to classical adverse selection,
in which individuals with characteristics that lead to higher health care utilization select into insurance plans with
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better coverage, selection on moral hazard may also exist. Selection on moral hazard is the result of individual heteroge-
neity in the behavioral response to health insurance. In particular, individuals might buy insurance because they expect
an increase in their health care consumption due to better coverage. Selection on moral hazard can be particularly rele-
vant for changes in insurance contracts. For example, if an insurer provides a contract with better coverage and relies
on average estimates of the price elasticity of demand, the insurer will underestimate the increase in costs due to moral
hazard. The more comprehensive coverage will attract individuals whose health care consumption would increase
more. On the contrary, if the insurer introduces a deductible to limit health care utilization, the insurer will over-
estimate the effect of such a decision; that is, higher deductibles will first attract individuals who are less sensitive to
health care prices. In this paper, we test for the existence of selection on moral hazard by using models that allow for
heterogeneous treatment effects.
As we mentioned previously, in our analysis, we use data from the LISS panel for the years 2009–2016. The panel is
based on a true probability sample of Dutch households drawn from the population register by Statistics Netherlands
and comprises 2,939 individuals. An advantage of the survey data is that it contains rich sociodemographic, economic,
and subjective health information that is not typically observed by the insurer in the Netherlands but can drive con-
sumers' choices. Moreover, this data set enables us to directly control for individual risk aversion, which, according to
economic theory, is an important determinant of demand for insurance. In addition, the panel structure of the data
allows us to avoid reverse causality issues because we can use independent variables that are determined before the
period of health care utilization.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we show the causal effect of a voluntary deductible on health
care utilization and demonstrate the difference in the effects on the extensive versus intensive margin of health care uti-
lization. Second, we add to the scarce evidence on the existence of selection on moral hazard. While we study these
issues in the institutional setting of the Dutch health care system, the results may also interest policy makers in other
countries that have mandatory private health insurance and voluntary deductibles, such as Switzerland, Germany, and
the United States.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the regulatory framework and the Dutch health insur-
ance system. Section 3 introduces the theoretical concepts of asymmetric information, adverse and advantageous selec-
tion, and moral hazard. Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 discusses the methodological issues. In Section 6, we
present our results, and in the final section, we offer some conclusions.
2 | REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
We use data from the Netherlands to examine the interdependence between moral hazard and adverse selection. In the
Netherlands, insurance companies operate under the Health Insurance Act, introduced in 2006 as a step toward regu-
lated competition. This law requires individuals to take out basic health insurance from a private health insurer. Health
insurers are obligated to accept everybody for basic insurance, and premiums are based on community rating (e.g., the
insurance premium is the same for all individuals regardless of their health status and other characteristics). Insurers
can compete on price and selective contracting. In 2018, individuals could choose among 24 health insurers and 55 dif-
ferent plans for their basic health insurance (Romp & Nijhof, 2018). In reality, however, competition in the market is
limited because all the health insurers fall under one of the 10 insurance concerns, four of which insure 86.5% of
the population.
The basic health insurance covers a predefined benefits package, and the GP acts as a gatekeeper for specialist care.
With a referral from the GP, all medically necessary curative specialist care, including mental health care and hospital
care, is covered by basic health insurance. Long-term care is not covered by basic health insurance but rather by the
Long-term Care Act (Wlz). Supplementary insurance can be purchased to cover services that are not covered by basic
health insurance, such as dental care, physical therapy, eyeglasses, plastic surgery, and so forth.
Adults are required to pay a mandatory deductible of €385 (2018) per year from which GP care, obstetric care, and
maternity care are exempted. (The mandatory deductible size has increased over years: 2009 = €155; 2010 = €165;
2011 = €170; 2012 = €220; 2013 = €350; 2014 = €360; 2015 = €375; and 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 = €385.) In addition
to the mandatory deductible, individual adults can opt for a voluntary deductible of €100, €200, €300, €400, or €500 per
individual per year.
The law states that the offered premium rebate must be equal for each insured person with the same deductible
level within the same health insurance product. In 2014, the premium rebate for the highest deductible level (€500)
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varied between insurance policies, from €180 to €300 per person per year, the average being €240 per person per year.
According to van Winssen et al. (2015), 50% of the Dutch population would profit from a maximum deductible, but only
11% actually had it in 2014. Although the law does not require insurers to exclude the same health care services (i.e., GP
care, obstetric, and maternity care) from the voluntary deductible as from the mandatory deductible, all insurers do this.
In addition, all insurers contribute to a risk equalization fund and are compensated for the risk profile of their
insured customers from that fund. Under perfect risk equalization, insurers would have perfect knowledge of the risk
profile of their insured customers and would be compensated accordingly. In reality, however, risk equalization is not
perfect, so insurers can offer large premium rebates in exchange for a higher deductible as a self-selection mechanism
(van Kleef, Van Vliet, & Van de Ven, 2013).
3 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 | Asymmetric information and adverse selection
Loosely following the intuition of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), we consider a simplified version of the Dutch
insurance market in which two insurance policies are available: one with a voluntary deductible (low coverage) and one
without a voluntary deductible (high coverage). Individuals can differ on two dimensions: their risk type and their risk
preferences (risk aversion). Because the insurer is not allowed to risk-rate the premiums, individuals possess private infor-
mation about their risk type and risk preferences. In a one-dimensional setting, high-risk individuals would buy high-
coverage insurance and low-risk individuals would buy low-coverage insurance, resulting in a correlation between
coverage and health care utilization, which is referred to as ‘adverse selection’ (Zweifel & Manning, 2000). The existence
of such a correlation has been used as evidence of asymmetric information (Chiappori & Salanie, 2000). In the case of
multidimensional heterogeneity, this correlation might not exist, even in the presence of asymmetric information. If risk
aversion also affects the choice of insurance coverage, more risk-averse people would buy high-coverage insurance, and
less risk-averse people would buy low-coverage insurance. Combining these two dimensions can yield unpredictable
results. For example, if high-risk individuals are, on average, less risk averse than low-risk individuals, we might observe
zero correlation between insurance coverage and health care utilization. Moreover, if the difference in risk aversion is
large enough, this might even result in a negative correlation, indicating ‘advantageous selection,’ as shown by Bolhaar
et al. (2012). This idea is easy to extend to a model with more than two dimensions of individual heterogeneity.
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) propose a simple test for multidimensional asymmetric information. They argue that
any available information that is not used by the insurer can indicate asymmetric information if it correlates with both
insurance coverage and health care utilization. If an individual characteristic has similar signs for both correlations, there
should be adverse selection and/or moral hazard, whereas opposite signs indicate the presence of advantageous selection.
We employ this method to test for asymmetric information in Section 6.2. In addition, we investigate the existence of a
selection effect by testing whether healthier and less risk-averse people are more likely to opt for a voluntary deductible.
3.2 | Moral hazard
Moral hazard is typically defined as excess demand for health investments due to having health insurance
(Pauly, 1968). This leads policy makers to introduce mechanisms that reduce moral hazard in medical care consump-
tion, such as copayments or deductibles.
The uptake of health insurance lowers the price of health care and reduces other consumption by the insurance pre-
mium. This means that households with (more) insurance will maintain a higher health level than those without insur-
ance. In addition, insurance creates an ex post transfer of income from the healthy to the infirm, and this may increase
utilization through an income effect on the demand for health care; in addition, it offers access to expensive health care
that would not otherwise be affordable (Nyman, 1999; Nyman & Maude-Griffin, 2001; Pauly, 1968). Therefore, individuals
who choose less insurance coverage (or a higher voluntary deductible) and experience a negative health shock consume
less health care than they would without the voluntary deductible (for a detailed discussion, see Bolhaar et al., 2012).
In addition, Einav et al. (2013) show that individual heterogeneity in the behavioral response to health insurance
can lead to selection on moral hazard. In particular, individuals might choose the size of the deductible expecting an
increase in their health care consumption due to better coverage.
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In our setting, we investigate moral hazard by testing whether people who opt for a deductible use less health care
given their health status. To allow for endogenous selection into the voluntary deductible, in our empirical approach,
we employ a linear regression with endogenous treatment and an exclusion restriction. In addition, we test for selection
on moral hazard by allowing for selection on returns in our empirical models.
4 | DATA
For the purpose of this study, we use data from the LISS panel. The panel is based on a true probability sample of Dutch
households drawn from the population register by Statistics Netherlands. It consists of 4,500 households and comprises
approximately 8,000 individuals. Households that could not otherwise participate are provided with a computer and
Internet connection. In terms of observable background characteristics, the LISS panel is representative of the
Dutch population.
The core study of the LISS panel contains several questionnaires, each administered on a yearly basis. This paper
combines information from the Health study and the study Measuring Higher Order Risk Attitudes of the General Pop-
ulation (hereinafter, ‘Risk Attitudes’). The Health questionnaire contains information on participants' medical history,
lifestyle, health care utilization, and health insurance information. The socioeconomic and demographic information is
updated each month. In addition, we include a risk aversion measure from the Risk Attitudes study.
For our analysis, we pool seven waves of the Health section of the LISS panel. These cover the years 2009–2016,
with the exception of 2014 when the Health questionnaire was not administered. In the waves before 2009, the ques-
tions related to health insurance in the Health questionnaire were formulated differently and therefore are not useful
for our analysis. This process yields 38,551 observations from 9,638 individuals for us to start with. The Risk Attitudes
questionnaire was administered to a random sample of 3,457 members of the LISS panel in 2009. We assume that risk
aversion remains constant during the time period covered by our data and assign this risk attitude information to each
panel member in each wave they participated in for the Health study. We drop observations with missing values in our
variables of interest and exclude all participants younger than 18 years of age because children do not have a deductible
in the Dutch health insurance system. This approach leaves us with a final sample of 14,089 observations from 2,939
individuals over seven waves.
4.1 | Health care utilization
We use four different types of health care as outcome variables from the LISS data. As a measure of primary health care
utilization, we use the yearly number of visits to a GP. Primary health care is usually not included in the mandatory or
voluntary deductibles in the Netherlands, but a referral from a GP is necessary to access secondary health care, which
is included in the deductible. As a measure of secondary health care utilization, we use the yearly number of visits to a
medical specialist. The tertiary health care utilization measure is the number of days spent in a hospital during last hos-
pitalization if hospitalized within the last 12 months (this variable is zero if a person has not been hospitalized). Finally,
because mental health and mental health care often follow different patterns than physical health and physical health
care (see, e.g., Blanchflower & Oswald, 2017, Bolhaar et al., 2012), we include a separate measure of the number of
visits to mental health care providers in the last 12 months.
All four of our health care utilization measures suffer from the common self-reporting problems. However,
according to a study by Dalziel, Li, Scott, and Clarke (2018), the recall period of 12 months seems to produce the least
biased health care utilization numbers compared with other recall periods, and the bias is more likely to be downward.
4.2 | Voluntary deductible
Our main variable of interest is a binary variable indicating whether a person opted for a voluntary deductible. Initially,
12.25% of our sample did not answer the question about the voluntary deductible or answered ‘do not know.’ However,
we exploit two characteristics of the Dutch insurance market to reduce the number of missing values. First, the default
choice in any insurance contract is to have no voluntary deductible. Thus, a person needs to actively opt-in for the vol-
untary deductible and also choose the size of the deductible. Therefore, we reason that people who do not know if they
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have a voluntary deductible most likely do not have it. Second, another option when the person does not make an
active choice about the voluntary deductible is to let the insurance contract roll over from the previous year with the
same conditions. Therefore, for all missing values, we first check if the person had a voluntary deductible during the
previous year, and if they did not change their insurer, we impute the previous year's value for voluntary deductible.
For participants with a missing value in the previous year, we impute a zero, assuming no voluntary deductible.1
Table 1 summarizes the proportion of people who opted for a voluntary deductible in each wave. Still, in our sample,
the proportion of people with a voluntary deductible is slightly higher than in the total population (see Romp &
Merkx, 2016). This suggests that our approach of assigning missing values as having no deductible does not lead to an
underestimation of people with a voluntary deductible.
4.3 | Control variables
Both theory and the literature (e.g., van Winssen, Van Kleef, & Van de Ven, 2016) predict that risk aversion is a poten-
tially important determinant of opting for a voluntary deductible in the Netherlands. The LISS data allow us to model
risk aversion explicitly. We include a risk aversion measure from the Risk Attitudes study in our analysis. Following
Noussair, Trautmann, and Van de Kuilen (2013), we measure an individual's risk aversion as the number of safe
choices he or she made out of the five decisions involving a sure payoff and a risky lottery. The sure payoff in the five
games was €20, €25, €30, €35, and €40. The risky option in all cases was an equiprobable lottery to receive either €5 or
€65. We assume that risk aversion is constant over the seven waves included in this study.
We model the risk type of participants with lagged health status variables. We argue that lagged health status is
more relevant than current health status because, in the Netherlands, insurance decisions are made at the end of the
previous year. We include a binary variable indicating ‘good’ or ‘very good’ self-assessed health as a measure of subjec-
tive health. Another binary variable indicates whether a person has any chronic conditions, representing an arguably
more objective measure of risk type. Finally, we include a measure of mental health, computed from the five-question
Mental Health Inventory (MHI-5) questionnaire included in the LISS Health study, which can be used to screen for
depressive symptoms and anxiety (Yamazaki, Fukuhara, & Green, 2005). The score for the MHI-5 is determined by
summing the scores of each question item (answers range in the frequency of experiencing a symptom from 1 = all of
the time to 6 = never) and then transforming the raw scores to a 0–100-point scale, where 100 indicates perfect
mental health.
Other dimensions of individual heterogeneity are sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics. This infor-
mation about the sample comes from the Background variables of the LISS panel, which are updated every month. Sim-
ilar to the health status variables, we match each wave of the Health data with the Background variables from
November of the prior year when insurance decisions were made. Finally, we include year dummies in all models to
control for any policy changes in insurance coverage and any other secular trends. Tables 2 and 3 summarize all the
data and their descriptives. In addition, Appendix S1 provides a full list of variables with detailed descriptions.












1As a robustness test, we also perform the main analysis without the imputed data. The results tend to be slightly less precise due to smaller sample
sizes but are generally robust to this exclusion. These results are available on request.
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5 | METHODS
5.1 | Asymmetric information and selection effects
The aim of this paper is to estimate the adverse (advantageous) selection and moral hazard effects of having a voluntary
deductible. In the Dutch institutional setting, insurance companies are not allowed to risk-rate insurance premiums,
which means that the existence of asymmetric information is inevitable. Individuals are free to choose the size of the
voluntary deductible, and the insurance company cannot refuse them. Nevertheless, because van Winssen et al. (2015)
find that the uptake of a voluntary deductible is much lower than would be profitable, it is an open question whether
consumers use their private information. Accordingly, when we refer to ‘asymmetric information,’ we mean the indi-
vidual's use of their private information in insurance coverage decisions and health care utilization.
We start with a descriptive analysis and establish that differences in health care utilization exist between people
with and without a deductible. We perform independent sample t tests to compare the two groups. However, as
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show, the mere existence of a difference might not reveal the full extent of the asym-
metric information if there are multiple dimensions of asymmetric information. In that case, as discussed in Section 3,
we can reject the null hypothesis of symmetric information if, conditional on the information used by the insurer in set-
ting insurance prices, we observe some other characteristic that is correlated with both the insurance coverage and
health care utilization of an individual. Because Dutch insurers are not allowed to risk-rate premiums, any individual
characteristics that are correlated with both insurance coverage and health care utilization would be an indication of
asymmetric information. Similar to Bolhaar et al. (2012), to perform this test, we model selection into the deductible
with a linear probability model (LPM)2 in Equation 1:
dit = x0itβ+ εit, ð1Þ
where dit is a binary variable indicating that person i has opted for a voluntary deductible in year t, xit is a (column)
vector of individual characteristics that are measured before the decision to take the deductible, β is a (column) vector
of parameters, and εit is the error term, which is assumed to be conditionally mean independent of xit. We estimate the
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics, whole sample, and subsamples with and without a voluntary deductible
Variable
All With a voluntary deductible No voluntary deductible t test
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Diff
Specialist visits 1.379 4.778 1.062 6.651 1.444 4.292 0.000
GP visits 2.258 5.108 1.810 4.085 2.350 5.288 0.000
Mental health care visits 0.501 3.887 0.469 3.004 0.508 4.044 0.659
Days in the hospital 0.521 4.264 0.302 2.803 0.565 4.504 0.006
Risk aversion 3.404 1.680 3.221 1.689 3.442 1.676 0.000
Male 0.494 0.500 0.541 0.498 0.484 0.500 0.000
Age 53.05 15.90 48.90 15.04 53.90 15.93 0.000
Educ.low 0.347 0.476 0.263 0.440 0.364 0.481 0.000
Educ.mid 0.324 0.468 0.306 0.461 0.328 0.469 0.042
Educ.high 0.329 0.470 0.431 0.495 0.308 0.462 0.000
Employed 0.522 0.500 0.644 0.479 0.497 0.500 0.000
Married 0.75 0.433 0.724 0.447 0.755 0.430 0.001
Log-income 7.839 0.504 7.891 0.533 7.828 0.497 0.000
Good health 0.221 0.415 0.313 0.464 0.202 0.401 0.000
Mental health inventory (MHI-5) 79.45 13.63 79.65 13.49 79.41 13.66 0.620
Chronic cond. 0.332 0.471 0.225 0.418 0.354 0.478 0.000
Smokes 0.192 0.394 0.210 0.408 0.188 0.391 0.018
Observations 14,089 2,396 11,693
Abbreviation: GP, general practitioner.
2As a robustness check, we also estimate the model with probit regression. The average marginal effects of the probit model are virtually identical to
the LPM coefficients.
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model using ordinary least squares (OLS), and standard errors are clustered at the household level. Any significant
coefficient βk means that the uptake of the deductible is not random, and we can interpret this as an indication of
selection effects.




where yit is a count variable indicating the number of visits to the specialist/GP/mental health care provider or days in
the hospital for person i in year t, γ is a vector of parameters, and uit is the error term. Because of the panel structure of
our data, we cluster the standard errors at the household level. In addition, we report the correlation coefficient ρ
between the residuals ε̂it and ûit for each of the four dependent variables in Equation 2. Similar to Bolhaar et al. (2012),
taking the results of Equations 1 and 2 together, we can deduce asymmetric information. In our case, opposite signs for
βk and γk mean that an individual characteristic that is associated with a lower probability of having a deductible
increases health care utilization, which suggests adverse selection and/or moral hazard. Accordingly, the same signs for
βk and γk would mean advantageous selection.
5.2 | Moral hazard effects
Having established the nature of the selection effects, we turn to estimating moral hazard effects while controlling for
sources of selection: risk type, risk preferences, and socioeconomic status. As we discussed in Section 3, moral hazard is
TABLE 3 Distribution of the outcome variables
Value
Specialist visits GP visits Mental health care visits Days in the hospital
Freq. Cum.% Freq. Cum.% Freq. Cum.% Freq. Cum.%
0 8,377 59.46 4,306 30.56 13,233 93.92 12,583 89.31
1 1,951 73.31 3,140 52.85 127 94.83 538 93.13
2 1,433 83.48 2,275 69.00 99 95.53 299 95.25
3 729 88.65 1,397 78.91 72 96.04 144 96.27
4 540 92.48 1,111 86.80 70 96.54 92 96.93
5 313 94.71 671 91.56 95 97.21 119 97.77
6 227 96.32 441 94.69 65 97.67 52 98.14
7 79 96.88 112 95.49 24 97.84 66 98.61
8 118 97.71 197 96.88 65 98.3 33 98.84
9 25 97.89 26 97.07 12 98.39 12 98.93
10 110 98.67 197 98.47 75 98.92 26 99.11
11 12 98.76 8 98.52 2 98.94 8 99.17
12 35 99.01 78 99.08 40 99.22 26 99.35
13 9 99.07 4 99.11 2 99.23 6 99.40
14 6 99.11 11 99.18 4 99.26 20 99.54
15 31 99.33 31 99.40 13 99.35 3 99.56
16 6 99.38 7 99.45 8 99.41 5 99.60
17 3 99.40 1 99.46 1 99.42 4 99.62
18 4 99.43 2 99.47 2 99.43 3 99.65
19 2 99.44 2 99.49 1 99.44 1 99.65
20 24 99.61 32 99.72 24 99.61 3 99.67
21 2 99.62 0 99.72 1 99.62 10 99.74
22 2 99.64 0 99.72 2 99.63 0 99.74
23 1 99.65 1 99.72 1 99.64 1 99.75
24 2 99.66 4 99.75 11 99.72 0 99.75
25 13 99.75 3 99.77 3 99.74 5 99.79
>25 35 100.00 32 100.00 37 100.00 30 100.00
Total 14,089 100 14,089 100 14,089 100 14,089 100
Abbreviation: GP, general practitioner.
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expressed as the effect of having a voluntary deductible on health care utilization, conditional on individual's health sta-
tus and preferences.
We start with a general model (Equations [3]–[7]) that specifies the two potential levels of health care utilization
(yit1, yit0), which are observed if individual i in year t opts for a voluntary deductible (dit = 1) or does not (dit = 0). The
potential outcomes of the treatment are assumed to depend linearly on a vector of observable characteristics x0it and
unobservables (uit1, uit0). The decision process for the choice of deductible is posed as a function of observables zit and
x0it and unobservables vit, and it is linked to the observed outcome yit through the latent variable dit
*. In the general case,
it is assumed that uit1, uit0, and vit are independent of zit, conditional on x0it . In addition, the probability of having a
deductible is a function of zit, conditional on x0it (Brave & Walstrum, 2014).
yit = diyit1 + 1−ditð Þyit0; ð3Þ
yit1 = x
0
itβ1 + uit1; ð4Þ
yit0 = x
0
itβ0 + uit0; ð5Þ
dit







In Equation 6, zit is an instrumental variable. Even though x0it contains a large number of important covariates, such as
risk aversion, health status, and socioeconomic status, there may still be some unobserved variables correlated with the
voluntary deductible choice and health care utilization variables. The literature has approached the choice of a valid
instrumental variable for insurance coverage in various ways. Some studies have used various socioeconomic character-
istics as instrumental variables (Buchmueller, Couffinhal, Grignon, & Perronnin, 2004; Harmon & Nolan, 2001;
Höfter, 2006), but this approach might not be ideal because these variables can be correlated with health care utiliza-
tion, as shown by Doorslaer, Koolman, and Jones (2004) and Fletcher and Frisvold (2009). Other researchers, such as
Jones et al. (2006) and Bolhaar et al. (2012), use lagged information on access to employer-provided health care or
insurance as an instrumental variable for private health insurance in countries with public health insurance. In the lit-
erature that specifically focuses on the effect of deductibles, Schellhorn (2001) employs a bivariate Poisson generalized
method of moments approach with endogenous treatment. Schellhorn uses the availability of supplementary insurance
cover and three dummies that categorize regions with a similar premium level along with the predicted choice of the
deductible as instruments for the deductible choice. Similar to Schellhorn (2001), we argue that in the Netherlands,
having supplementary health insurance is exogenous to the utilization of basic health care. The Dutch supplementary
insurance covers health services that are not covered by the basic health insurance, such as physiotherapist visits, den-
tal care, eyeglasses, and so forth, but it does not directly affect the treatment choices or out-of-pocket payments within
the services covered by the basic insurance. Therefore, it should not directly influence the number of visits to physi-
cians. Yet choosing supplementary insurance is strongly correlated with choosing the deductible. Both are influenced
by unobservable personal health and risk preferences. Therefore, we employ the availability of supplementary insur-
ance as an instrumental variable for the voluntary deductible.3
We begin our analysis with a restricted case, in which we assume that the effect of the deductible on health care uti-
lization is homogeneous. In our potential outcome setup, this means that β1 = β0 and the treatment effect of the deduct-
ible is E(yit1 − yit0) = δ for all i and t. This setup allows us to model moral hazard by applying bivariate models. Because
our health care utilization variables are corner solution responses with a corner at 0 (see the distributions in Table 3),
we model both the decision to have any doctor visits (extensive margin) and the number of visits (intensive margin).
3The panel structure of our data allows creating additional instruments by interacting the supplemental insurance with the year dummies. In a
robustness analysis, including these additional instruments in our models does not change the results, hence they are left out of our main analysis.
These results are available on request.
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Accordingly, we employ a bivariate probit model for the choice to have any physician visits and a log-linear regression
with endogenous treatment for the number of visits.
First, we model the choice to have any physician visits. We apply the bivariate probit model to two binary depen-
dent variables, yit, which represents having any physician visits/hospital stays, and dit, which represents having a volun-
tary deductible. We allow for correlation between the corresponding error terms. Given the observed covariates x0it , we
can write the bivariate model in terms of a latent variable specification:
yit = δ
extdit + x0itβ+ uit





where δext is the coefficient for the effect of the voluntary deductible on the extensive margin, which in our case can be
interpreted as the causal effect of moral hazard. β and βd are vectors of coefficients for the covariates x0it , and zit is the
instrument. The observed values are then written as follows:
yit =









We assume that the error terms are drawn from a standard bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit vari-








Assuming that the model is correctly specified, ρ = 0 implies that dit is exogenous with respect to yit. Consistent estima-
tion of the unknown parameters in the model can be achieved using the method of maximum likelihood. Given our
data structure, we cluster the standard errors at the household level.
To model the number of visits, we apply a log-linear regression with endogenous treatment to the observations,
where yit > 0. The model is composed of an equation for the outcome yit and an equation for the endogenous treatment
dit. The endogenous variable dit for voluntary deductible is modeled as in Equations 4 and 6. The health care utilization
yit is a linear model:
ln yitð Þ= δintdit + x0itγ1 + uit: ð12Þ
The error terms are drawn from a standard bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit variances, and correla-
tion coefficient ρ, the same as in Equation 11. We interpret δint as the causal effect of moral hazard on the intensive
margin. We estimate the model with quasi-maximum likelihood, and we cluster standard errors at the household level.
Both δext and δint show the incentive effect of a voluntary deductible conditional on individual characteristics.
According to theory, when facing the same health shock, people with a voluntary deductible would use less health care
than those without a voluntary deductible. Accordingly, we expect negative signs for δext and δint.
In the next step, we relax the homogeneity assumption. As Einav et al. (2013) demonstrate, individuals might buy
insurance because they expect an increase in their health care consumption due to better coverage. Einav et al. (2013)
call this phenomenon ‘selection on moral hazard.’ In the econometrics literature, it is more generally known as ‘selec-
tion on returns’ or ‘essential heterogeneity.’ Essential heterogeneity arises when individuals decide to take the treat-
ment in relation to their expected response to the treatment, meaning that there is individual heterogeneity in
treatment effects (Brave & Walstrum, 2014).
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Marginal treatment effect (MTE) estimators have been developed to study the impact of a treatment that is likely to
vary within a population in correlation with observed and unobserved characteristics, for example, when individuals
self-select into a treatment. The MTE concept was defined by Björklund and Moffitt (1987) and further described by
Heckman & Vytlacil, 2007) and Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006). In empirical work, MTEs have been used to esti-
mate effects of breast cancer treatment (Basu, Heckman, Navarro-Lozano, & Urzua, 2007), returns on education
(Carneiro, Heckman, & Vytlacil, 2011), the effect of family size on quantity and quality of children (Brinch, Mogstad, &
Wiswall, 2017), and the marginal returns of universal childcare (Cornelissen, Dustmann, Raute, & Schönberg, 2016).
Péron and Dormont (2018) use MTEs to assess selection on moral hazard in supplementary health insurance. Consider-
ing that the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible might be related to the expected moral hazard response, we esti-
mate MTEs to capture heterogeneity in response to the voluntary deductible and to test for the existence of selection on
returns (e.g., on moral hazard).
Appendix S5 presents a detailed description of the estimation procedure for MTEs as an extension to the framework
discussed previously. In our analysis, we use a parametric polynomial model to estimate MTEs (see Brave &
Walstrum, 2014); we also present the results of the parametric normal and semiparametric models in Appendices S6–
S10. The MTEs tell us how much higher or lower an individual's health care utilization is expected to be given a small
increase in the propensity to not take out a voluntary deductible. In the polynomial model, Heckman et al. (2006) pro-
pose that the joint significance of the polynomial coefficients φj in equation (22) (see Appendix S5) reveals the presence
of essential heterogeneity. In the case of the third-degree polynomial, φ1 = φ2 = φ3 = 0 would mean that the treatment
effect does not vary with unobservable characteristics; that is, that there would be no evidence of essential heterogene-
ity. In addition, β0 captures the effect of observed individual characteristics on health care utilization without the volun-
tary deductible, whereas β1 shows their effect with the voluntary deductible. A significant difference between β1 and β0
indicates a change in the impact of observed characteristics on health care utilization due to a higher deductible. In this
model, the heterogeneity in moral hazard that stems from changes in the effects of regressors comes in addition to the
heterogeneity that stems from unobserved characteristics.
6 | RESULTS
6.1 | Descriptive statistics
First, we investigate the descriptive statistics in Table 2, which shows means and standard deviations of all variables for
the whole sample, for the subsample that has opted for the voluntary deductible, and for those who have no voluntary
deductible. The last column provides the p value of a t test comparing the means of the two subsamples. We start by
looking at the four health care utilization measures included in this analysis. As expected, we observe that individuals
who select a voluntary deductible have, on average, fewer visits to a specialist, their GP, and mental health care pro-
viders and fewer days spent in the hospital than those who do not have a voluntary deductible. For visits to the special-
ist, GP, and days spent in the hospital, the difference is statistically significant at a 5% level. For visits to mental health
care providers, the difference is not significant, but it has the same sign as other health care utilization variables. The
raw data show that less insurance coverage is associated with significantly lower health care utilization. We consider
this the first sign of asymmetric information for visits to the specialist and the GP and days spent in the hospital. For
visits to mental health care providers, there is no evidence of asymmetric information.
Next, we compare the characteristics of individuals with and without a voluntary deductible. People who opt for a
voluntary deductible are less risk averse, are more often male, are younger, are more highly educated, are more likely
to be employed, are less likely to be married, have higher incomes, have better self-assessed health, are less likely to
have chronic diseases, and are more likely to smoke. These differences are statistically significant, suggesting that indi-
viduals who opt for a deductible are different from those who do not.
6.2 | Multidimensional asymmetric information
Because Dutch insurers are not allowed to risk-rate premiums, any individual characteristics that are correlated with
both insurance coverage and health care utilization can be considered an indication of asymmetric information
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(Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006). We model self-selection into a voluntary deductible and health care utilization more
formally in Table 4.
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the coefficients of the pooled OLS, regressing the voluntary deductible on individual
characteristics as in Equation 1. As we expected, the results show that more risk-averse individuals are significantly less
likely to select a voluntary deductible. In addition, older individuals, married people, and those with chronic conditions
are less likely to opt for a voluntary deductible. Conversely, the probability of having a voluntary deductible is higher
for males, highly educated people, and healthy individuals. This is in line with the results of van Winssen et al. (2015),
who also find that these are the population groups who can benefit the most from opting for a voluntary deductible.
To investigate if any individual characteristics are correlated with both insurance coverage and health care utiliza-
tion, we analyze Columns 2–5 of Table 4, which show the results from pooled OLS regressions with the four health care
utilization measures as outcomes. Taken together with Column 1, these results show that being male and having good
self-assessed health is associated with a higher probability of having a voluntary deductible and lower utilization of spe-
cialists, a GP, and (only good health) hospital care.
The opposite is true for having a chronic condition; specifically, we observe a lower probability of having a volun-
tary deductible and higher utilization of all types of care. This suggests adverse selection and/or moral hazard in the uti-
lization of specialists, a GP, and hospital care. The variable indicating the mental health status of the individual (MHI-
5) shows that better mental health is associated with a lower probability of having a voluntary deductible and also lower
utilization of all types of care, including mental health care. This suggests advantageous selection on mental health
care; in other words, healthier individuals select more insurance coverage even after controlling for risk aversion. Nota-
bly, the average marginal effects of age show adverse selection with regard to specialist and GP visits but, again, advan-
tageous selection with regard to mental health care visits.
In summary, the test proposed by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) indicates the presence of multidimensional
private information. In the case of mental health care utilization, some dimensions lead to adverse selection and some
TABLE 4 Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates to test for selection and multidimensional asymmetric information
Variable









Risk aversion −0.0098*** (0.0032) −0.0074 (0.0300) −0.0159 (0.0302) 0.0335 (0.0270) −0.0022 (0.0220)
Male 0.0253** (0.0100) −0.3039*** (0.0876) −0.7317*** (0.1176) −0.0684 (0.0754) 0.0111 (0.0675)
Age 0.0028 (0.0018) −0.0473** (0.0210) −0.0301 (0.0224) 0.0412* (0.0211) −0.0137 (0.0172)
Age2 −0.00005*** (0.0000) 0.0007*** (0.0002) 0.0006** (0.0002) −0.0006** (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0002)
Employed 0.0162 (0.0116) −0.2083** (0.1053) −0.2521* (0.1300) −0.3178** (0.1553) −0.2554** (0.1300)
Educ.mid −0.0036 (0.0118) −0.2363* (0.1259) −0.2758** (0.1250) 0.0633 (0.1249) −0.0958 (0.0845)
Educ.high 0.0489*** (0.0134) −0.1696 (0.1114) −0.2332 (0.1420) 0.2320 (0.1478) −0.0155 (0.1082)
Married −0.0363*** (0.0140) −0.0268 (0.1629) −0.0029 (0.1304) −0.0889 (0.0898) −0.1266 (0.1089)
Good health 0.0598*** (0.0131) −0.3616*** (0.0615) −0.4396*** (0.0700) −0.0579 (0.0599) −0.1255*** (0.0466)
MHI-5 −0.0006* (0.0003) −0.0190*** (0.0051) −0.0339*** (0.0056) −0.0425*** (0.0074) −0.0129** (0.0060)
Chronic cond. −0.0507*** (0.0101) 1.2380*** (0.1269) 1.1802*** (0.1226) 0.1978* (0.1026) 0.6009*** (0.1011)
Smokes 0.0132 (0.0130) −0.0231 (0.1126) −0.1939 (0.1318) 0.0535 (0.1064) −0.0793 (0.0763)
Log-income 0.0160 (0.0127) −0.0640 (0.1316) −0.3427*** (0.1103) −0.1665 (0.1070) 0.0547 (0.0906)
Constant 0.0602 (0.1077) 4.0785*** (1.3272) 8.0109*** (1.1307) 4.6716*** (0.8390) 1.6114** (0.7839)
Average marginal
effect of age
−0.0023*** (0.0004) 0.0225*** (0.0049) 0.0320*** (0.0048) −0.0215*** (0.0045) 0.0023 (0.0039)
Observations 14,089 14,089 14,089 14,089 14,089
R-square 0.044 0.0409 0.0608 0.0346 0.0109
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level and presented in parentheses. The specifications include year dummies.
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lead to advantageous selection. As a result, the raw difference in mental health care utilization between individuals
with and without a deductible is not significant (see Table 2).
6.3 | Moral hazard in health care utilization
Having established asymmetric information and selection, we turn to estimating moral hazard in health care utiliza-
tion. Using the models described in Equations 8–12, we model the decision to have any physician visits/hospital stays
and the number of visits/days separately.4 Controlling for sources of asymmetric information, such as risk aversion and
risk type, a significant, negative relationship between the dummy for a voluntary deductible and the utilization vari-
ables can be considered evidence of moral hazard.
Table 5 presents the bivariate probit results, including an exclusion restriction. The first-stage results indicate that
supplementary insurance is a relevant instrument for the voluntary deductible because the coefficients are very signifi-
cant. In the second stage results, the outcome is the probability of having any physician visits/days in the hospital.
The parameter ρ at the bottom of Table 5 measures the correlation of the residuals of the first- and second-stage
models. For all four models, this correlation is highly significant, indicating that endogeneity is an important concern.
TABLE 5 Voluntary deductible and the probability of having any physician visits: bivariate probit results
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specialist visits GP visits Mental health care visits Days in the hospital
First stage (voluntary deductible)
Sup. insurance −0.4493*** (0.0438) −0.4361*** (0.0454) −0.4273*** (0.0462) −0.4253*** (0.0469)
Risk aversion −0.0430*** (0.0126) −0.0430*** (0.0128) −0.0423*** (0.0127) −0.0402*** (0.0127)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second stage (outcome (P(Y > 0)))
Vol.deduct. −1.0292*** (0.1271) −0.6844*** (0.1706) −0.6416** (0.2550) −1.228*** (0.1448)
Risk aversion −0.0041 (0.0100) 0.0023 (0.0104) −0.0067 (0.0172) −0.0096 (0.0108)
Male −0.1649*** (0.0345) −0.4524*** (0.0350) −0.1206** (0.0549) 0.0273 (0.0349)
Age −0.0145** (0.0061) −0.0106 (0.0066) 0.0060 (0.0109) −0.0157** (0.0065)
Age2 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) −0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001)
Employed −0.0638 (0.0403) −0.0577 (0.0419) −0.0179 (0.0633) 0.0235 (0.0426)
Educ.mid 0.0043 (0.0404) 0.0253 (0.0435) 0.1147* (0.0697) −0.0545 (0.0425)
Educ.high 0.1010** (0.0439) 0.0892* (0.0473) 0.2243*** (0.0717) 0.0536 (0.0441)
Married −0.0911** (0.0450) 0.0359 (0.0450) −0.0643 (0.0636) −0.0356 (0.0488)
Good health −0.1807*** (0.0391) −0.2080*** (0.0373) −0.0476 (0.0693) −0.0792 (0.0495)
MHI-5 −0.0041*** (0.0011) −0.0084*** (0.0012) −0.0259*** (0.0017) −0.004*** (0.0012)
Chronic cond. 0.5628*** (0.0397) 0.3761*** (0.0395) 0.1597** (0.0648) 0.2273*** (0.0477)
Smokes −0.0829** (0.0403) −0.1154*** (0.0413) 0.0437 (0.0638) −0.0143 (0.0425)
Log-income 0.0553 (0.0379) −0.0465 (0.0396) −0.0884 (0.0603) 0.0297 (0.0407)
Constant −0.2373 (0.3063) 1.7446*** (0.3320) 1.4112*** (0.4853) −0.6134* (0.3362)
Observations 14,089 14,089 14,089 14,089
ρ (rho) 0.506*** 0.307*** 0.389** 0.689***
Log-likelihood −14,407 −13,775 −8,769 −10,611
Average marginal effect vol.deduct. −0.3143*** −0.2337*** −0.0552** −0.163***
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level and presented in parentheses. Both stages of the specifications include wave
dummies.




4For comparison, Appendix S2 presents the results of simple probit and OLS regressions, whereas Appendices S3 and S4 present the results from the
same bivariate models as the main results but without an instrument because bivariate models are identified by their functional form.
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Turning to the coefficients, we observe a significant, negative effect of having a voluntary deductible on the proba-
bility of visiting a specialist, a GP, or a mental health care specialist or being hospitalized. We present the average mar-
ginal effects at the bottom of Table 5 and show that the effects of the voluntary deductible are large. Having a voluntary
deductible decreases the probability of any specialist visits by 31 percentage points (p.p.), GP visits by 23 p.p., mental
health care specialist visits by 5.5 p.p., and hospitalizations by 16 p.p.
Table 6 presents the results of the log-linear regression with the endogenous treatment variable, including an exclu-
sion restriction. Again, first-stage results indicate that supplementary insurance is a relevant instrument for having the
voluntary deductible. In the second stage results, the outcome is the logarithm of the number of physician visits/days in
the hospital. The parameter rho shows that the residuals of the first- and second-stage equations are correlated for the
number of specialist visits, GP visits, and days in hospital, indicating endogeneity. The residuals are not correlated for
mental health care visits.
Next, we consider the effect of having a voluntary deductible. The coefficients show that having a voluntary deduct-
ible reduces the number of specialist visits by approximately 18.7% and the number of GP visits by approximately
27.1%, ceteris paribus. The significant effect on GP visits seems surprising at first because GP visits are excluded from
the deductible. However, because the GP acts as a gatekeeper for other kinds of care that are subject to the deductible,
it is possible that having the deductible reduces visits to the GP that would be made with the intention of getting a refer-
ral to a specialist. The effect on the number of mental health care visits is not statistically significant. Notably, the coef-
ficient of the voluntary deductible is positive in the model for the number of days spent in the hospital (Column 4).
TABLE 6 Voluntary deductible and the number of physician visits (if positive): log-linear regression with endogenous treatment
(estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood)
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specialist visits GP visits Mental health care visits Days in the hospital
First stage (voluntary deductible)
Sup. insurance −0.3445*** (0.0670) −0.3898*** (0.0513) −0.6990*** (0.1382) −0.2140** (0.0865)
Risk aversion −0.0343** (0.0174) −0.0434*** (0.0140) −0.0622* (0.0368) −0.0786*** (0.0266)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second stage (outcome (ln (number of visits/days))
Vol.deduct. −0.1870** (0.0854) −0.2714*** (0.0602) −0.3524 (0.3123) 1.5449*** (0.1116)
Risk aversion −0.0053 (0.0079) 0.0021 (0.0064) 0.0491** (0.0230) 0.0064 (0.0194)
Male −0.0426 (0.0276) −0.1496*** (0.0217) −0.0003 (0.0818) 0.0207 (0.0658)
Age −0.0102** (0.0050) −0.0047 (0.0039) 0.0254* (0.0135) −0.0085 (0.0112)
Age2 0.0001** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) −0.0003** (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001)
Employed −0.0653** (0.0326) −0.0595** (0.0265) −0.0257 (0.1047) −0.2597*** (0.0821)
Educ.mid −0.0805** (0.0360) −0.0454* (0.0275) −0.0494 (0.1089) −0.1341* (0.0771)
Educ.high −0.0694** (0.0353) −0.0693** (0.0288) 0.1643 (0.1224) −0.2028** (0.0814)
Married 0.0130 (0.0356) −0.0128 (0.0294) 0.0346 (0.1109) −0.1337 (0.0862)
Good health −0.1536*** (0.0302) −0.1511*** (0.0226) −0.1246 (0.0978) −0.0549 (0.0870)
MHI-5 −0.0052*** (0.0009) −0.0069*** (0.0008) −0.0088*** (0.0023) −0.0024 (0.0023)
Chronic cond. 0.2566*** (0.0267) 0.2159*** (0.0232) −0.0554 (0.0824) 0.2354*** (0.0634)
Smokes 0.0137 (0.0345) −0.0563** (0.0281) 0.0702 (0.0959) 0.0259 (0.0814)
Log-income −0.0611** (0.0294) −0.0706*** (0.0267) −0.1201 (0.0989) 0.0121 (0.0857)
Constant 1.9740*** (0.2622) 2.0009*** (0.2215) 2.4867*** (0.7831) 0.9775 (0.7514)
Observations 5,712 9,783 856 1,506
rho 0.142*** 0.205*** 0.101 −0.850***
sigma 0.750 0.693 0.956 1.043
lambda 0.106 0.142 0.0968 −0.886
SE lambda 0.0360 0.0282 0.177 0.0627
Log-likelihood −8,487 −14,060 −1,539 −2,476
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This means that conditional on having any hospitalization, people with a deductible spend 155% longer in the hospital.
Because they are less likely to be hospitalized, these individuals seem to avoid hospitalization for less severe issues and
go to the hospital only for more serious health problems. Interestingly, risk aversion does not seem to be significantly
associated with health care utilization, except for the number of mental health care visits, even though it is a significant
determinant of selection into the voluntary deductible (first stage). As we expected, health care utilization seems to be
driven mostly by individuals' health status. Altogether, it seems that voluntary deductibles help reduce moral hazard,
especially on the extensive margin.
6.4 | Selection on moral hazard
The models estimated in the previous section assume that the moral hazard effect is homogeneous across individuals.
In this section, we test this assumption by allowing for both heterogeneities in the effects of regressors and heterogene-
ity that stems from the unobserved propensity to opt for a voluntary deductible. For this purpose, we estimate the MTEs
of having a voluntary deductible on the natural logarithm of our four health care utilization measures on the sample of
individuals who have a positive number of visits/hospital days using a parametric polynomial specification. We com-
pute standard errors by bootstrapping and cluster at the household level.
The results presented in Table 7 show no evidence of selection on moral hazard, because the polynomial terms p1,
p2, and p3 are not individually or jointly significant for any of the outcome variables. The average treatment effect of
the voluntary deductible (E(Y1–Y0)) appears to be imprecisely estimated but has the same signs as in Table 6. In addi-
tion, Figure 1 shows that the MTEs do not differ from zero at any point of the distribution of the propensity not to take
out a voluntary deductible (ud). The results from the parametric normal and semiparametric models in Appendices S5–
S10 also show no evidence of selection on moral hazard, but they estimate the treatment effects more precisely. We con-
clude that selection on moral hazard is not an issue in the choice of a voluntary deductible in the Dutch health insur-
ance system. Individuals do not seem to choose the size of their deductible based on potential changes in their health
care consumption due to a larger deductible.
FIGURE 1 MTEs of polynomial (3) model. ATE, average treatment effect; GP, general practitioner; MTE, marginal treatment effect
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
1266 ALESSIE ET AL.
In addition, for the three types of physical health care (specialist visits, GP visits, and hospitalization days), the
(β1–β0) terms are jointly insignificant, indicating homogeneity in the effects of the explanatory variables between those
with and without a voluntary deductible. This suggests that the results from Section 6.3 are robust. Nevertheless, for the
utilization of mental health care, the terms (β1–β0) are jointly significant, suggesting that the utilization of mental
health care for people with a voluntary deductible is different relative to the same characteristics than it is for the peo-
ple without a deductible.
7 | CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses the LISS panel data from the Netherlands to investigate whether voluntary deductibles in the Dutch
health insurance system reduce moral hazard or act as a premium reduction tool for low-risk individuals. The descrip-
tive statistics show that less insurance coverage is indeed associated with significantly lower health care utilization,
except for mental health care. The test for multidimensional asymmetric information by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)
indicates that although the three types of physical health care utilization exhibit adverse selection, mental health care
utilization is subject to advantageous selection.
The results of our analysis of selection into a deductible show that risk-averse individuals are significantly less likely
to opt for a voluntary deductible. Moreover, older individuals, married people, and those with chronic conditions are
less likely to opt for a voluntary deductible, whereas the probability of having a voluntary deductible is higher for
males, highly educated people, and healthy people. These findings are in line with the results of van Winssen
et al. (2015), who show that these population groups benefit the most from a voluntary deductible.
Furthermore, we show that a voluntary deductible is an effective tool for reducing moral hazard in the Dutch health
insurance system. Moreover, our results indicate that it is important to model both the decision to use any health care
and the decision about the amount of health care to use, as the effects differ between the two decisions. Although hav-
ing a voluntary deductible reduces the probability of using health care, the effects on the amount of utilization differ.
We do not find evidence of selection on moral hazard; that is, individuals do not seem to consider their potential
change in behavior when choosing a deductible.
Remarkably, the effect sizes are large, which is common in the literature (e.g., Gardiol et al., 2005). Having a volun-
tary deductible decreases the probability of specialist visits by 31 p.p., GP visits by 23 p.p., mental health care specialist
visits by 5.5 p.p., and hospitalizations by 16 p.p. Considering the amount of health care utilization, having a voluntary
deductible reduces the number of specialist visits by approximately 19.7% and the number of GP visits by approximately
27.1%. It seems that mental health care utilization responds to incentives in a different way than physical health care
because the effect on the number of mental health care visits is not statistically significant. Notably, a voluntary deduct-
ible has a positive effect on the number of days spent in the hospital, conditional on having any hospitalization. Individ-
uals with a deductible spend 155% longer time in the hospital than those without. It seems that individuals who opt for
a voluntary deductible avoid hospitalizations for less severe issues and go to the hospital only for more serious health
problems. Another possibility is that they postpone hospitalization until the moment that the health problem becomes
more severe.
In summary, even though a voluntary deductible creates incentives for adverse (or in the case of mental health care,
advantageous) selection, it is an effective tool for reducing moral hazard in health care utilization. These effects seem
universal on the extensive margin (having any physician visits/hospitalizations) but differ between the types of health
care on the intensive margin (amount of utilization).
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